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Abstract
Online social network (OSN) users are exhibiting an increased privacy-
protective behaviour specially since multimedia sharing has emerged
as a popular activity over most OSN sites. Popular OSN applications
could reveal much of the users’ personal information or let it easily de-
rived, so favouring different types of misbehaviour. In this article we
deal with these privacy concerns by applying fine-grained access con-
trol and co-ownership management over the shared data. Our proposal
defines access policy as any linear boolean formula that is collectively
determined by all users being exposed in that data collection namely
the co-owners. All co-owners are empowered to take part in the pro-
cess of data sharing by expressing (secretly) their privacy preferences
and, as a result, jointly agreeing on the access policy. Access poli-
cies are built upon the concept of secret sharing systems. A number of
predicates such as gender, affiliation, or postal code can define a partic-
ular privacy setting. User attributes are then used as predicate values.
In addition, by the deployment of Privacy-enhanced Attribute-Based
Credential (Privacy-ABC) technologies, users satisfying the access pol-
icy will gain access without disclosing their real identities. We have
implemented our system as a Facebook application demonstrating its
viability, and procuring reasonable performance costs.
Keywords.- Online Social Networks, Privacy-aware Access Control,
Anonymity, Co-Ownership Management, Attribute-based Credential
System
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, privacy is globally considered a very valuable personal asset.
However, we find ourselves, more and more often, spreading most of our
personal details, eating habits, work life etc. across many different domains
and online scenarios [1]. Indeed, online social networks (OSNs) get hold
of a huge amount of personal data which, in the majority of cases, even if
uploaded by a particular user, involves several ones. In this context, chal-
lenging privacy issues arise from co-ownership of shared personal data, since
tagging is a common technique. Users tag a particular piece of data, e.g. a
photo or any other resource, with a set of individual names leaving access
control policies out of the co-owners control. As a result, the owner (here
considered as the uploader as well) does choose between the available set of
different granularities most in the way of options like Only Me, Friends Only,
etc. or by providing user-defined friend lists. These common controls range
from limitation of profile access, item-level access control, to other features
such as blocking and hiding other site users, however, do not consider or
evaluate other co-owners’ preferences that could be conflicting between each
other.
In this work, we aim to demonstrate the suitability of quite robust cryp-
tography primitives to address some of the foregoing privacy issues in the
context of OSNs. In particular, these are the primary contributions of this
article:
• Co-ownership management of shared data collections. Our aim is at
empowering not only the data owner but also the co-owners to take
part in the process of expressing (secretly) their privacy preferences of
the shared data to be published and, as a result, jointly agreeing on its
access policy. Access policy is then collectively determined by all users
exposed in that data collection while, at the same time, individual
privacy preferences are kept hidden. To encounter this challenge, a
method for the collectively establishment of the privacy settings for
shared data in OSNs can be built upon the concept of threshold secret
sharing [2].
• Fine-grained access control management. We represent access policies
as any linear boolean formula (or a conjunction of formulas) which
compile every co-owner’s privacy preferences over the shared data.
A number of predicates such as gender, age, affiliation, nationality
or postal code can define a particular data privacy setting. User at-
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tributes are then used as predicate values for fine-grained access control
management.
• Anonymous access to shared data. OSN users who prove that they
satisfy the access policy will gain access to those shared resources
without disclosing their real identities. Therefore, users hold a cer-
tified list of attribute-values which in the way of a credential will be
used to make statements about themselves (or a subset of their at-
tributes) anonymously and in a certified manner. The application of
a privacy-enhanced Attribute-Based Credential (ABC) system will as-
sure anonymous and unlinkable authentication and data access control
[3].
Our proposal then combines threshold secret sharing and anonymous
ABC algorithms into a novel model for a privacy-aware management of the
shared data access and co-ownership in OSNs. In particular, Joint Random-
Secret Sharing (JRSS) [2] will provide co-owners executing the co-ownership
management with the confidentiality of their privacy preferences. The access
to OSNs data will be also prevented from profiling, gossiping and other
privacy concerns with social networking by the inclusion of the ABC System
presented in [3] which is based on U-Prove [4] for authorization purposes.
We develop a Facebook application called CANONYM (Co-ownership and
Anonymity) to evaluate the feasibility of our proposal.
The reminder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the related work. Section 3 provides a brief overview of our system compo-
nents and building blocks. We further elaborate on each system phase in
Section 4. System implementation is described in 5. Finally, in Section 6
we establish the main conclusions.
2 Related Work
Related work has been investigated in three different areas: co-ownership or
collaborative privacy management, access control and anonymity in OSNs.
2.1 Co-ownership Management in OSNs
Communication Privacy Management theory states that the decision to dis-
close private information to others involves negotiating expectations about
how the information will be collectively managed once divulged [5]. How-
ever, collective privacy management in OSNs has been sparse so far and
headed by very simple voting-based approaches [6, 7].
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A. Squicciarini and H. Hu are the initiators of co-ownership manage-
ment. Squicciarini et al. present a Clarke-Tax algorithm to take collective
privacy decisions about the access control policy to apply which are based
on path distances. Later on, Squicciarini et al. introduce CoPE, an appli-
cation to promote collaborative specification of policies focused on the most
highly voted option [6]. Similarly, a multiparty authorisation framework
for Facebook-style social networks is developed by H. Hu et al. in [7] and
significantly extended in [8]. Authors propose a multiparty policy specifica-
tion scheme defining the logical representation of access control policies, as
well as a policy evaluation mechanism which deals with policy conflicts by
keeping the balance between the need for privacy protection and the users’
desire for information sharing. Evaluation of a prototype implementation
showed a measurement of average expected privacy risk and sharing loss.
B. Carminati and E. Ferrari introduce the term collaborative security
policies [9]. Data owners establish access control policies taking into account
distance and trust of their contacts’ relationships. These policies are sent to
co-owners asking for feedback.
Previous approaches compromise some users’ privacy, however, there
are a couple of exceptions. Work in [10] allows the establishment of access
control policy when all users reach a full consensus. Moreover, [11] presents
a mechanism based on decomposable image-based objects to guarantee, in
a fine-grained way, all users’ privacy.
2.2 Cryptographic Approaches to Privacy and Access Con-
trol in OSNs
Significant work has been done exploring cryptographic approaches to en-
hance the content sharing privacy on OSNs. Work in [12] presents a public-
key protocol which achieves relationship protection without the presence of a
central node so enabling private relationships using certificates or verifiable
credentials.
A number of the proposed access control models leverage users’ at-
tributes. These attributes, e.g. relationships, roles, or other contextual
information, can be used to aid users in configuring their settings and ex-
pressing their privacy preferences with a fine-granularity [13]. There are
some other works also ensuring access control in OSNs through public key
cryptography and attribute-based encryption (ABE) over group members,
mainly considering a fully distributed approach [14, 15]. In [15] a novel
cryptographic primitive based on ABE and relationship links is introduced.
Authors introduced an access control framework and implemented it as a
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Facebook application without having to trust the OSN manager. Similar to
Persona framework [14], attribute conditions are applied to specify access
policies concerning the protected data. However, the set of attribute values
are not prevented from being inferred making user transactions traceable,
linkable and observable.
2.3 Approaches to Anonymity in OSNs
User anonymity in OSN has been addressed mainly by preventing topology-
based attacks and focusing on the recognition of the social network structure
[16]. For instance, A. Campan et al. proposed the generalization of a pair
of clusters of OSN users where users become indistinguishable [16].
Furthermore, system called Gossple in [17] associates every OSN user
with a set of anonymous acquaintances who share common interests, whereas
Pisces presented in [18] anonymizes communications, most in the way of
TOR.
Our approach has common points with some recent approaches such as
[19] which apply authorization modalities that do not sacrifice user anonymity
by the use of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (ZKPoK). Pedersen Com-
mitment Scheme is employed by N. Shang et al. in [19] to develop a novel
attribute-based access control mechanism for protecting content dissemina-
tion (in health care applications). Besides, with regard to decentralization,
other works have applied threshold-based secret sharing protocols for ad-
dressing different problems in OSNs [20].
2.4 Discussion
Table 1 depicts a summary of the analysis to the related work. First, there
is a general lack of fine-grained access control management and definition
of privacy policies mostly due to existing work bases on direct or indirect
relationships, or, at most, n-hop distanced. Both co-ownership and fine-
grained access control are addressed in [11] where objects are composed of
parts. Owners assign each object’s part to the appropriate user who be-
comes a co-owner and who specifies attribute-based access control policies.
Access to each part is independently granted or denied according to poli-
cies established by the associated/ assigned user (the owner or a co-owner).
Likewise in H. Hu et al.’s work [8], voting strategies have also been applied
to aggregate an obtained score and, by establishing thresholds, access be-
comes denied, granted, or restricted to a set of users (e.g. owner-overrides,
full-consensus-permit, majority permit).
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Table 1: Analysis of the related work.
Types of policies Secret specifica- Manage Anonymity of
tion of preferences co-ownership
A. Campan et al. [16] OSN users
M. Prateek et al. [18] Communications
M. Bertier et al. [17] OSN users
A. Squicciarini et al. [21] owners/ n-distance users/
public
√
Clarke-Tax algorithm
A. Squicciarini et al. [6] co-owners only/ some-
friends/ public
√
The most voted op-
tion
H. Hu et al. [7] [8] owner-overrides/full-
consensus-permit/ ma-
jority permit/ strong-
majority permit/ super-
majority permit
Score based on sensi-
tivity level and its ag-
gregation
B. Carminati et al. [9] n-distance users/ One, all or the most
trust voted option
K. Thomas et al. [10] Full consensus
Gonza´lez-Mazano et al. [11] Based on attributes Each user manages
conditions and their objects’ parts
obligations
R. Baden et al. [14] Based on attributes
S. Jahid et al. [22] Based on attributes
S. Braghin et al. [23] Based on attributes
Secondly, Squicciarini et al. proposals point out the secretly specifica-
tion of preferences. In particular, work in [6] proposes a voting scheme
in which by default, co-owners (called stakeholders) have no knowledge of
other users preferences. Co-owners specify their preferences (namely some-
friends, public or co-owner) and the most voted option is the established
policy. However, there is no further elaboration on the way of that secrecy is
performed, nor explanation if, at some point, an entity realised about other
users’ preferences. Thus, anonymity and co-ownership are independently
managed without considering the significance of their joint application [24].
3 Background and System Overview
We describe all necessary components, roles and phases of the proposed
system.
3.1 Joint Random-Secret Sharing
JRSS has been extensively studied and used in threshold cryptography and
secure multiparty computation (see details [2, Section 6.3]). Besides, the im-
plications of deploying threshold-based secret sharing in a distributed OSN
have been recently tackled in [25]. The essential notion to this scheme is that
a number of participants comes together to generate a random-secret piece of
information in a unanimous consensus manner by contributing each’s private
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input. Without the assistance of any third trusted party, each participant’s
input has an equal influence on the determination of the secret whereas this
is kept undisclosed.
3.2 Anonymous Attribute-Based Credentials
ABC systems provide a friendly privacy-preserving mechanism to minimize
the amount of personal data disclosed during authentication and authoriza-
tion processes whilst ensuring correctness of the data.
Various interesting aspects of ABC systems make them very suitable to
be used in practice in current OSNs:
• An ABC is a certified list of attribute-values. The main idea behind
anonymous ABC is that users can prove statements about themselves
(a subset of their attributes) anonymously and in a certified manner.
• A number of predicates (boolean expressions built applying logic, com-
parison and arithmetic operations to attribute values) over the ABC
attributes can be formulated and then used to evaluate if certain con-
ditions are satisfied for a particular access control policy, e.g. only
teenagers are authorized according to the ID card/passport.
• Anonymous ABC systems are based on the concept of ZKPoKs [26].
Users of anonymous ABCs are able to prove, to a verifying entity, hold-
ership of the credential, knowledge of all attribute values or that such
values satisfy a given property (such as belonging to a range or satis-
fying a function) without revealing the attribute values themselves.
Our anonymous ABC system for OSNs is based on Persiano et al. Anony-
mous Credential System [3] which is based on U-Prove [4]. In this system,
users must prove on a zero-knowledge fashion that they know the value of
their hidden attribute values but also equally important is that those values
satisfy a linear relation specified in a boolean formula. Furthermore, as in
the Idemix [27], Persiano et al. system supports the following properties:
(i) Issuance-show unlinkability1 by which the ABC issuer cannot recognize
credentials when they take part in showing protocols and, (ii) Multi-show un-
linkability by which multiple showings of the same ABC cannot be linked.
1The ABC system in [3] preserves issuance-show unlinkability, this is, the authority
issuing the credential cannot link the credential issued with the credential being shown to
the verifying entity. The system also offers multi-show unlinkability so different uses or
shows of the same credential can be linked together).
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In this article, the process that a user must follow to obtain and use an
ABC is described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively, although leaving the
description of the mathematical foundations and formal proofs to the cited
publications.
3.3 Roles and Phases
The system defines two non-mutually exclusive roles for OSN users and is
divided in three phases, namely
• Co-Ownership Management. The Originator is an OSN user who
wants to control the access to some shared resource which is co-owned
by one or more Co-owners. In general, the Originator and Co-owners
know each other and are connected via the OSN site. They all will
gather together for establishing the access control policy for that re-
source. No one in the process will be able to realise about others’
privacy preferences for the resource.
• ABC Acquisition. A central organization called Issuer is in charge of
providing users with their corresponding anonymous ABCs. The User
role is then granted during this phase by asking the Issuer for a valid
ABC.
• Resource Access. Users, who want to access such shared resource,
need to anonymously and unlinkably prove possession of a valid ABC
encoding a particular set of attributes satisfying the access control
policy. The resource is published by a Provider ; this is either the
Originator, or any other User or Co-owner who had got previously
access to the resource and published it afterwards.
4 Proposed System Phases
We illustrate at a high-level our privacy-enhanced ABC system phases, and
some technical details are omitted (we refer the reader to the corresponding
literature for further mathematical foundations).
4.1 Co-Ownership Management Phase
In this phase, co-owners of a shared resource gather together for the genera-
tion of its privacy policy at the request of the Originator. The privacy policy
of a common shared data is represented as any linear boolean formula (or
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a conjunction of formulas) which compiles every co-owner’s privacy prefer-
ences over that data. Hence, a number of predicates such as status, gender,
age, departmental affiliation, nationality and postal code, to name a few,
will define a particular data privacy setting.
Example: Oscar uses an OSN to keep in touch with people he knows
and decides to share a particular collection of photos about his new physical
skills of fitness at the gym. He is only interested in sharing these photos
with his friends from the neighborhood being currently over 18. Obviously,
the predicate “age> 18” can be activated to filter minors and, so on so forth.
However, four more people appear in the photos who are members of the
same health club that Oscar frequents and, have got user accounts2 in the
same OSN site. Thus, instead of uploading the photo collection with his
own privacy policy, Oscar enrolls these four friends into the execution of the
Co-Ownership Management phase.
Without loss of generality, our proposal is described assuming that users
are authenticated based on the values of their identity attributes (x1, · · · , xk),
which can be derived from a standard certificate signed by some trusted
external entity (i.e., a certification authority). Therefore we represent a pri-
vacy policy of a shared resource ξ as the boolean formula Φξ(x1, · · · , xk) = 1
whose inputs are the authentication attributes of a user. It combines a series
of boolean formulas specifying the privacy preferences whose relations are
linear in those attributes, i.e., such formulas are connected by ∧,∨,¬ logical
connectives.
For the sake of illustration, considering the predicate “age> 18” defined
above there exists a linear equation on two attributes (x1, x2) which can be
derived from a valid passport such that x1 = 6 and x2 = 24 of a user aged
24 can be proven to satisfy the equation x1 + 18 = x2, i.e. the user is over
18. Our proposal can be easily extended to any number of attributes and
the semantics3 may differ from the one in the example. For instance, from a
propositional logic point of view, an access control rule can be represented
by a linear boolean formula over the specific predicates (or a function on
them) and their relations, for a certain resource. The semantics attached to
defining predicates should be adapted to each specific case. As a particular
2We assume that other participants have to be registered in the OSNs to be part of
the system.
3We also consider that, either by a third party or even crowdsourcing, the attribute
’Friend of’ can be certified and then used as user attribute as well as to build policy
predicates.
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Figure 1: Joint establishment of the privacy preferences.
setting, the following formula:
(x1 + 18 = x2) ∧ (¬x3 = “BCU”) ∧
(
(x4 + 28000 = x5) ∨ (x4 + 8000 = x5)
)
defines a privacy policy in which the co-owners agree on grating access to
over-18 users, not affiliated with “BCU” and registered in Madrid (postcode
range 28000-28999) or Barcelona (postcode range 8000-8999).
The reasons behind the generation of these parameters in a joint and
secret manner are mainly two: (1) Resource co-owners can secretly im-
pose privacy preferences on the access to their private common resources
(co-owners will learn nothing about each others’ preferences) and, (2) the
resulting parameters are the combination of the preferences of all co-owners
which maximizes the global social utility and promotes fairness encouraging
truthfulness among the co-owners.
Figure 1 is a conceptual depiction of our Co-Ownership Management
phase. Thus, considering the particular scenario to filter adults such that
“age> 18” (step 1), the originator starts the process by asking the other n−1
co-owners of the collection of data to be published, for secretly sharing their
privacy preferences over that predicate (step 2a). In practice, this predicate
can be represented as a binary variable being encoded numerically either by 1
so activating the filter or 0. Each co-owner contributes its preference (which
is kept confidential thanks to the JRSS algorithm) over that predicate and
sends it over to the Originator/server side (step 2b). Once all co-owners’
preferences are compiled, the policy is generated, and stored in the server
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along with the protected collection of data depending on the JRSS output
(steps 2c and 3, respectively). More precisely, a restrictive policy will be
applied to the shared data if the output jointly computed falls within the
range [n2 , n]. Otherwise, values within the interval [0,
n
2 ) leave the data
accessible, with no age control. We refer the interested reader to [2] and to
our implementation described in Section 5. For the sake of completeness,
the basics steps for the JRSS to share a secret integer over Zq (for any q
prime) are detailed in the pseudocode below.
Algorithm 1 JRSS algorithm over Zq (for any q prime)
Require: Co-owner i generates a t-degree polynomial f
Ensure: f(0) = secret integer
(Step 1) Originator picks attribute label
(Step 2) Originator notifies Co-owners
for all i ∈ Co− owners− Set do
{ai0, . . . , ait} ∈ Zq ← t+ 1 random values
Construct the polynomial f i(x) =
∑t
k=0 a
i
kx
k
for all j ∈ Co− owners− Set do
Calculate value f i(j)
Unicast f i(j)
Collect (t+ 1) values {f j(i)}
end for
f(i)←∑j f j(i)
(Step 3) Originator sets the policy f(0)←∑j aj0
end for
4.2 ABC Acquisition Phase
As previously mentioned, we have based our work on the ABC system by
Persiano’s et al. [3]. In their work, authors describe a series of five algo-
rithms namely SetUp, Enroll, IssueCred, ProveCred and VerifyCred which
conform the whole Credential System and which operate on a set of chosen
global parameters (an algebraic group G, a subgroup of G of certain order
and a series of generators). The mathematical operations performed (com-
mitments and ZKPoKs) on those parameters and on the User’s attributes
are based upon the Problem of the Discrete Logarithm and, are designed to
prove possession of an ABC, digitally signed by the corresponding authority,
which encodes the correct attribute values.
We assume that such a credential system is set-up properly by a certain
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certification authority (namely the Issuer, which is not necessarily the same
as the OSN service provider) which executes algorithm SetUp on input the
publicly verifiable parameters4 known as Pub. The Issuer also obtains the
private information Priv which corresponds to the public information Pub
that she will use to release user ABCs. Detailed information and mathe-
matical properties of these two tuples are fully described in [3] and [28].
In particular, the proposed ABC Acquisition phase is based and inher-
its the instructions from the algorithms Enroll and IssueCred in [3, Sec-
tion 4.2]. During this phase a User presents non privacy–aware credentials
to the Issuer which is responsible for the verification and extraction of the
attributes5 (x1, x2, . . . , xn) that will be encoded in attribute-based creden-
tial. The Issuer is also responsible for the construction and signature of the
ABC. Hence, the ABC is not more than a digitally signed tuple of encoded
values of the form:
ABC = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xn, x, z, v〉
where xi references each of the User attributes, x and z are random numbers
chosen by the Issuer and v is the signature of the Issuer over them. Thus,
the Issuer constructs, from a series of non privacy–aware certificates, a new
privacy–aware certificate.
In the example considered above, Oscar and his friends, after executing
the ABC Acquisition phase, will come into possession of a signed ABC en-
coding the attributes that will be required and used to access the OSN site
services and contents.
4.3 Resource Access Phase
Any User can be granted access to the shared resources iff his/her subset of
attributes required satisfies the access policy.
The Resource Access phase is performed by a User (as the prover) re-
questing access to a particular resource ξ and a provider6 (as the verifier)
responsible for enforcing the access control policy of ξ. This phase is based
4Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing plays an important role in the design of protocols
for secure multi-party computation as everybody is able to verify that the shares have
been correctly distributed.
5For the sake of completeness, note that (x1, x2) ∈ Ze so 0 ≤ x1, x2 < e being e ∈ Pub
such that e is prime, e 6= 2, e ∈ Z∗n, gcd(e, 3) = 1 and n is the modulus, product of two
safe primes. We refer the interested reader to [3] for further details on the mathematical
foundations of this credential system.
6The provider is a User who is currently publishing the resource and could or not be
part of the Co-owners set.
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and inherits the instructions from the algorithms ProveCred and VerifyCred
in [3, Section 4.2]. However, a few enhancements to these phases have been
developed and implemented to attain further features. For instance, during
credential verification, the Provider gets response to challenges that prove
that the attributes encoded in the User’s ABC satisfy the boolean formula
Φξ which bases on linear relations amongst the attributes. The Provider
cannot learn anything about attributes’ actual values. That is, any friend
connected to Oscar and/or his friends will have anonymous access to the
shared contents if and only if her attributes being verified against the for-
mula give true.
The overall phase is shown in Figure 2 which shows the high-level se-
quence of steps corresponding to phase Resource Access. Note that the User
could hold one or more ABCs stored in a repository. Each ABC could be
signed by a different authority and may encode different attributes. Simi-
larly, the provider has control over a series of resources each one attached
to an access control policy. The flow is as follows:
1. The User requests a particular resource ξ.
2. In steps (2a) and (2b), the Provider makes the corresponding access
control policy known to the User Φξ(x1, x2, . . . , xn). In the step (2c),
the User then uses the Policy-credential matcher to find a suitable
credential (if any) whose attributes fulfill such particular policy.
3. In step (3a), to avoid traceability and linkability, the User produces
a randomized and unique version of the original ABC and constructs
commitments on the values of such randomized credential and sends
(step 3b) them to the verifier to be store (step 3c).
4. The User and the Provider engage in a number of four ZKPoK over
the encoded attributes as witnesses. In this regard, the Provider sends
messages (4a), (4b) as a series of challenges to the User. These chal-
lenges are randomly generated by the Provider.
5. In steps (5a) and (5b), the User generates the corresponding responses
to those challenges and sends them to the Provider which is in charge
of the verification process (step 5c).
The User must follow the steps above to accomplish such proofs as the
key part of the anonymous ABC access control system7. As a result, the
Provider is convinced of the following:
7By using such proofs, at the cost of one exponentiation per base it is possible to
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Figure 2: Resource Access phase. Our proposal bases on an ABC authenti-
cation and authorisation in the domain of OSNs where users are identified
by a subset of their certified attributes that can be or not the same subset
required for grating access to the data collections.
• The User holds an ABC such that their encoded attributes satisfy
Φξ(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 1. The verifier does not learn the values (x1, x2, . . . , xn).
• The User has created fresh and correctly the series of commitments
accompanying the ZKPoKs.
• The ABC held by the User includes a valid signature v, correctly
constructed and signed by a valid Issuer.
• The randomized version of the ABC over which the computations are
performed is fresh.
We refer the reader to [28, Section 3.3]-Credential Proving for a com-
plete description of these ZKPoKs and to Section 5 where we present the
implemented prototype details of this phase.
5 System Implementation
In order to evaluate the feasibility of the proposed system and of the re-
lated protocols, a Facebook (FB)-shaped application called CANONYM
prove in a witness indistinguishable manner knowledge of a discrete logarithm or of a
DL-representation or of an RSA-representation [3].
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(Co-ownership & Anonymity) has been developed8 to provide FB users with
co-ownership management and anonymous access to photo albums related to
a particular topic and/or community. We consider a disable people commu-
nity so shared content’s privacy preferences can be bounded by being below
or under 18, being or not a disabled person and being or not an European
citizen. A simple web interface was created to simulate both Originator and
Co-owner roles at the Co-ownership Management phase as well as Provider
and User engaging in the Resource Access. The whole prototype hence was
implemented as a mockup, with local hosting and databases.
Our evaluation was intended to cover basic aspects which may concern
users aiming to carry out the functionalities described in previous sections:
• Time spent in the computation and communication by participants
running the JRSS for the joint establishment of the access policy.
• Confidentiality of the privacy preference.
• Cost overhead (in terms of time) of the anonymous access to data
namely time consumed in both computing the credential token and
verifying the policy against it.
Furthermore, the following assumptions are noticed. The establishment
of access control policies requires Originators to be logged in FB. By con-
trast, Users accessing the content may act out of FB. Moreover, co-owners
have to be FB friends. Finally, Users are supposed to have already loaded
at least an ABC on their Internet explorer, therefore the ABC Acquisition
phase is not implemented for this piece of work.
5.1 System Architecture
As depicted in Figure 3, our development applies a client-server architecture
and comprised the following modules:
• FB server : Its purpose is to store the resources along with resource
names and other metadata.
• CANONYM server : Given restrictions to develop FB applications,
this server comes into play. It consists of the following components:
8CANONYM prototype has been developed using J2EE and J2SE 1.6 over an Apache
Tomcat v7.0.37 applying a MySQL data base.
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 Figure 3: CANONYM architecture
The CANONYM manager executes two main tasks, namely the com-
putation of the resource access control policies and the verification of
policies upon incoming access requests.
Concerning the former task, this component computes a joint policy
for a given photo album based on the Originator and (t+1) Co-owners
privacy preferences. A list of attributes and/or predicates are available
in the server and can be easily selected by the Originator to establish
the policy predicates considered in the policy generation. Moreover,
assuming that all parameters are computed locally to each Co-owner,
CANONYM manager cannot infer individual user preferences (see Sec-
tion 4.1).
Regarding the policy verification, CANONYM manager is in charge
of verifying a requester’s ABC satisfies the policy associated with the
requested resource. If the process in Section 4.3 succeeds, the access
is granted and the appropriate link to the FB content is delivered,
otherwise the access is denied.
Policies DDBB is a set of databases for the storage for the partial com-
putations meanwhile the JRSS is being executing and final retrieval of
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resources’ access control policies.
• Client : A couple of components are identified within this module:
Client manager This module is mainly devoted to the computation
of Users’ contribution to the establishment of the shared data access
policy, and the computation of the responses to the challenges sent by
the Server when verifying policies.
Concerning the computation of a data policy, each User specifies its
personal privacy preferences that are sent to CANONYM server in
such a way that the disclosure of individual users preferences remains
infeasible. With regard to the access requests, the Client manager,
using stored ABCs provides the necessary data to prove policies veri-
fication.
ABCredentials DDBB is a database to manage the storage and re-
trieval of ABCs from the local repository.
• The system also needs an anonymizer (e.g. TOR9) to prevent attacks
occurred at the network level.
With a web-based interface, our prototype allows us to experiment with
the functions implemented at both the Co-ownership Management and Re-
source Access phases. The interface was kept simple as to access easily
to the databases of users, attributes/predicates, policies, ABC and partial
computations.
5.2 Co-ownership Management Implementation
The implementation of the Co-ownership Management phase is shown in
pseudocode. This phase is initiated by the Originator at the manager side
who chooses an album, selects the Co-owners involved and starts JRSS ex-
ecution as follows:
1. The Originator selects preferences (xi) namely age, nationality and
disability, and, as a result, (t − 1) random values ai are created per
managed attribute, where t refers to the number of users involved in
the process (Alg. 2 lines 1-10). Note that values ai are created in the
manager and sent to the client.
9https://www.torproject.org/, last access June 2013
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Algorithm 2 Polynomial of each user
1: array a
2: for i=0:AllUSers do
3: aAtt1[i]=random() {Att1 refers to AGE}
4: end for
5: for i=0:AllUSers do
6: aAtt2[i]=random(){Att1 refers to NATIONALITY}
7: end for
8: for i=0:AllUSers do
9: aAtt3[i]=random(){Att1 refers to DISABILITY}
10: end for
11: array valuePoly
12: for i=0:AllUsers do
13: for j=0:aAtt1.length() do
14: valuePolyAtt1[i]=aAtt1[j] * Pow(idsUsers[i],j+1) {Pow(x,y) means x is raised by the y
power}
15: end for
16: end for
17: for i=0:AllUsers do
18: for j=0:aAtt2.length() do
19: valuePolyAtt2[i]=aAtt2[j] * Pow(idsUsers[i],j+1)
20: end for
21: end for
22: for i=0:AllUsers do
23: for j=0:aAtt3.length() do
24: valuePolyAtt3[i]=aAtt3[j] * Pow(idsUsers[i],j+1)
25: end for
26: end for
27: UserId=n
28: for i=0:idsUsers.length() do
29: if n=idUsers[i] then
30: array value
31: Store valuePolyAtt1[i]
32: Store valuePolyAtt2[i]
33: Store valuePolyAtt3[i]
34: end if
35: end for
2. For each attribute and Co-owner, f ′(x) =
∑t
k=0(a
i
k ·xk) is constructed
accordingly (Alg. 2 lines 11-26). Figure 4 depicts CANONYM inter-
face for the establishment of privacy preferences.
3. The value of the polynomial in the Originator’s ID is locally stored in
the form of a vector and f j(j) for each Co-owner’s ID (j) are sent to
the manager to be stored in the DDBB (Alg. 2 lines 27-35).
4. A FB private message is sent over to each Co-owner requesting spec-
ification of their personal preferences, so repeating steps 1-3. Once
the last Co-owner defines his preferences, the rest of them and the
Originator are notified to compute the final access control policy, that
is, the final polynomial. To do this, each User introduces the stored
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Figure 4: CANONYM interface for establishment of privacy preferences.
∑
ajo delivered in Alg. 4, and the Lagrange interpolation is finally
computed, concluding the JRSS and reaching the jointed policy (Alg.
3).
We conducted experiments over different sizes for group of Co-owners to
measure the average time of execution of the JRSS algorithm which is O(n)
in terms of the communication cost between n entities. A Table albumPref-
erences stored at the Policies DDBB centralises communications and keeps
traces of (i) the identifier of the album to which the joint policy should be
applied (idAlbum); (ii) the identifier of the co-owner who defines a particu-
lar preference (idUserOrigin); (iii) the identifier of the co-owner applied for
the polynomials calculations (idUserDestination); and (iv) (t − 1) random
values (a1, a2, a3) also related to polynomials calculations. Note that the
value of the personal polynomial in each user’s ID is locally stored to prevent
the DDBB from inferring users preferences. This database is also inaccessi-
ble by Co-owner’s client. This phase then linearly depends on the number
of co-owners involved and their promptness of successfully completing the
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Algorithm 3 Final polynomial
1: array x = idsUsers
2: array y
3: array valuesAllUsersAtt1 = valuePolyAtt1[i] AllUsers
4: array valuesAllUsersAtt2 = valuePolyAtt2[i] AllUsers
5: array valuesAllUsersAtt3 = valuePolyAtt3[i] AllUsers
6: for i=0:numAttInPolicy do
7: y[i] = valuesAllUsersAtt+”i”
8: end for
9: array finalPolicy
10: for i=0:numAttInPolicy do
11: finalPolicy[i]=interpolateLagrange(x,y[i])
12: end for
privacy setting. Computation at every node is negligible.
A Note on the Incentives for Co-operation Enforcement. This
phase requires Co-owners to co-operate to be successfully completed. Ex-
isting approaches to stimulate and foster user/node cooperation are mainly
based on the application of incentives mechanisms. For example, in [21] the
use of a Clarke-Tax algorithm provides participating parties with the incen-
tive to provide their privacy preferences in the collectively specification of
the access policy. A tax will be assessed to each individual. The amount of
this tax depends on how the individual’s utilities affect the rest of the group.
Policies are then established regarding the maximization of the social utility
and ensuring the trustfulness of co-owners.
5.3 Resource Access Implementation and Evaluation
The access to a given photo album is initiated by a User client requesting it
to the server side. At the client side, a Credential Matcher procedure queries
the ABC DDBB for a valid ABC to perform the credential proving and sends
results to the Co-owner. Algorithm 4 and 5 depict the pseudocode, from
the User and Provider point of view respectively, showing the steps needed
to prove and verify that the user’s private attributes (x1, x2, x3) satisfy the
boolean formula Φξ(x1, x2, x3) = 1. Note that mathematical details follow
[28] where similar details for the rest of proofs are fully demonstrated.
We also evaluate the computational10 cost in terms of time spent by the
Resource Access phase as the User has to create a randomized version of his
10Technical details: The analysis has been performed on a 3GHz Intel Core 2 Duo, 4Gb
RAM.
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Algorithm 4 ZKPoK1 commitment (Client-side credential proving)
1: vas x, x1, x3 g, g1, g2, g3 are public
2: var e = getE()
3: var N = getN()
4: var t = numNodes
5: var γ = random().inGroup(Pow(2,t))
6: var α = valuePolyAtt1[0]
7: var β = valuePolyAtt2[0]
8: var y = random().inGroup(e)
9: var rprime = random().inGroupCoprimes(N)
10: var ry = random().inGroup(e)
11: var r1 = random().inGroup(e)
12: var r2 = random().inGroup(e)
13: var tprimeAux=Pow(g,ry) * Pow((g1* Pow(g2, α)),r1) * Pow(g3,r3)* Pow(rprime,e)
14: var tprime= Mod(tprimeAux, N) {Mod(x,y) means x mod y}
15: var sy=γ * y + Mod(ry, e)
16: var s1=γ * x1 + Mod(r1, e)
17: var s3=γ * x3 + Mod(r3, e)
18: var sprimeAux=Pow(g, (γ * y + ry)) * Pow((g1 * Pow(g1,α)), (γ * x1 + r1)) *
Pow(g3, (γ * x3 + r3)) * Pow(x, y) * rprime
19: var sprime= Mod(sprimeAux, N)
ABC upon each request of access to the protected content. Our prototype
interface allows us to test the User client creating the credential token and
the server manager verifying the policy. On average, we found that creating
such credential takes 28143 ms whereas its verification takes only 8138 ms.
Additionally, in the case of unsuccessful verifications when User’s ABC does
not satisfy the privacy policy, the overhead is reduced to an upper bound
of 8272 ms. Also, note that data transmission must be anonymized so an
extra delay has to be added. We believe that our system computational
cost is more than acceptable as to manage data collections in current OSN
applications.
Moreover, we can compare our system with closely related work such
as the framework in [15] also implemented as a FB application. In their
experiments, authors found linearity between the framework performance
and the resource size, mainly due to the use of content encryption, e.g.
accessing a 500KiB content took about 400000 ms. Our implementation
does not suffer from such a data length dependency. The Co-ownership
Management phase is affected, however, by the lack of synchronization of
co-owners to provide their privacy preferences. Cooperation is then needed
and its enforcement is out of the scope of this paper. To this regard, a
simple analytical model based on Cooperative Game Theory is introduced
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Algorithm 5 ZKPoK1 commitment verification (Co-owner-side credential
proving)
1: Received vars: sy, s1, s3, sprime, tprime, γ {Note that in this implementation, for
being a simulation, contrary to [28] tprime, γ are also sent to the Provider}
2: var ahatAux= Mod((Pow(g,y)*m), N)
3: var partVerification1 = Pow((ahat* (Pow(g2,-β))), γ) * tprime
4: var partVerification2Aux = Pow(g, sy) * Pow((g1 * Pow(g2, α)), s1) * Pow(g3, s3) *
Pow(sprime,e)
5: var partVerification2 = Mod(partVerification2Aux, N)
6: if partVerification1 = partVerification2 then
7: Access granted if ZKPOK2, ZKPOK3 and ZKPOK4 are also correct
8: else
9: Access denied
10: end if
in [29] to evaluate the feasibility and outcomes of cooperative interactions
in OSNs, being this model applicable to this proposal’s validation.
A Note on the Usability Evaluation. Usability does have an impact
on privacy management in OSNs like FB. For this reason, our prototype is
functional and has been built to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of
the crypto functions used. The interface created for managing the new pri-
vacy settings is web-based and tries to minimise complex user interactions.
Though the Co-ownership Management phase relies on the cooperation and
(desired real-time) disposal of the co-owners, experimental results showed
that the overhead incurred is acceptable. Our immediate work is to develop
this functionality as a FB application which simulates photo management
through the proposed technique to measure the real users’ satisfaction.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed and implemented a privacy-enhanced access
control system for OSNs which deals with both, co-ownership management
of shared data and anonymous access to that data. The system’s main appli-
cation scenario is of sharing large collections of photos or privacy-aware data,
involving multiple co-owners who keep their privacy preferences anonymous
in the collectively construction of the data’s access policy. Any system user
can be grated access to the data iff the user attributes satisfy the policy.
Besides, some remarkable strengths are noticed. First, privacy preferences
are secretly defined by each co-owner and, neither other users nor the OSN
site server are able to learn about them. Secondly, users can be authenti-
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cated and authorised anonymously preventing privacy related concerns like
profiling and gossiping. Finally, the use of attributes-based access control
policies facilitates a fine-grained access control management. Immediate fu-
ture work is on the development of the proposed functionality as a FB plugin
to evaluate real usability. Furthermore, the need of cooperation of co-owner
at the Co-ownership Management phase can be alleviated by an incentive
mechanism.
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